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Does the Parliament Make a Difference? 
The Role of the Italian Parliament in Financial Policy 
 
 
A recent survey conducted in a sample of 83 countries by the Inter-Parliamentary Union 
in collaboration with the World Bank Institute on the “Relations between the 
Legislature and the Executive in the Context of Parliamentary Oversight” allows cross-
national comparison for the role of legislatures in the budgetary process. One of the 
survey’s most significant indications is that legislatures in presidential systems are 
generally more involved in the preparation of the budget than legislatures in either 
parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. The picture, however, is very different 
when we look at legislatures’ oversight of the budget. Parliaments are generally more 
involved in the examination and final approval of the budget than are legislatures in 
presidential and semi-presidential systems1. In the light of these considerations, it 
should not be terribly surprising to find that the executive is more likely to be 
accountable to the legislature for its spending in parliamentary systems than in 
presidential systems.  
 
All this seems to imply that legislatures in parliamentary have considerable power to 
influence and shape the budget. In reality, however, this power is remarkably inferior to 
what the list of formal powers suggests. Each parliament’s ability to examine, amend, 
modify, confirm, and approve the budget is constrained by both institutional and 
political factors. On the institutional side, in many countries Parliament’s ability to alter 
the government’s budget is subject to extensive procedural limits.2 For example, in the 
UK, Parliament can amend tax proposals, but cannot increase spending.3 In Germany, 
                                                          
1 On these and related issues, see Riccardo Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst, “Legislatures and Oversight: A 
Note”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, “Legislatures and Oversight: A Note”, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, 
vol. XI, n. 1 (aprile) 2004, pp. 175-188; an abridged version of the paper can also be found in Riccardo 
Pelizzo and Rick Stapenhurst (eds.),  Legislatures and Oversight, World Bank Institute Working Paper- 
Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development (forthcoming); see also Riccardo Pelizzo 
and Rick Stapenhurst, “Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation”, World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3388, September 2004. 
2 For comparative data concerning the passage of the budget in parliament see Valentine Herman (in 
collaboration with Françoise Mendel), Parliaments of the World. A reference compendium, New York, De 
Gruyter, 1976, pp. 762-791; International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation of the Inter-
parliamentary Union, 2nd edition, Aldershot, Hants (UK), Gower, 1986, pp. 1091-1122. Updated 
information can be found in Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Role of 
Legislature. 19th Meeting of Senior Budget Officials, Paris 25-26 May 1998. PUMA/SBO (98)4, 
unclassified, pp. 1-80. 
3 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Role of Legislature. 19th Meeting of Senior 
Budget Officials, Paris 25-26 May 1998., op. cit., p. 76. 
parliamentarians’ ability to modify the budget is constrained by budget regulations as 
well as by the expenses generated by current legislation.4 On the other hand, there are 
countries, such as Belgium and Canada, where there are no institutional limits on 
Parliament’s ability to amend the budget. While such conditions might imply extensive 
legislative participation, there are, however, fairly obvious political limits to such 
potential interference. Significant modification of the executive’s budget would imply a 
loss of confidence of the parliamentary majority and would, in all likelihood, initiate or 
exacerbate a government crisis.  
 
This means that the preparation, choice and implementation of the budget are 
influenced by both institutional and political conditions. But which are more important? 
What predictions of legislative activity can be made? We attempt to answer these 
questions first by outlining the institutional and party system theories that explain 
Parliaments’ ability to shape budget and by testing these theories on changes to the 
national budget in the Italian Parliament. The Italian Parliament is an excellent 
preliminary case study for the theory that institutional and political conditions influence 
Parliament’s ability to modify the national budget for two reasons. On the institutional 
side, the Italian has a complex array of procedural opportunities within the legislature, 
which may encourage extensive parliamentary activity during the amendment and the 
passage of the budget. On the political side, Italy has experienced undisciplined parties 
(and coalitions) and government instability (Pelizzo and Cooper 2002), both of which 
have led to general legislative ineffectiveness (Pelizzo and Babones 2001). 
Furthermore, and most importantly, there have been extensive changes to both the 
institutional design and the political climate of the Italian Parliament over the past 20 
years. As a result, with a quasi-experimental design, we can gauge if there was any 
change in legislative activity after the institutional and/or political changes occurred. 
This can be done using original data that measures the difference between the 
government’s proposed budget and the parliament’s final law each year. Positive 
findings would compel us to conclude preliminarily that institutions and political 
conditions matter significantly for parliament’s real ability to modify a national budget.  
 
Institutional Theories 
 
In virtually all parliamentary systems, the executive in parliamentary systems fully 
controls budgetary politics. Parliament’s role is purposively restricted. Because the 
executive is paramount for setting the national budget, the comparative literature on 
budgeting reflects the importance of executive institutions (Roubini and Sachs 1989; 
Borrelli and Royed 1995; Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). This literature emphasizes the 
collective action problems within the executive for reaching decisions.  
                                                          
4 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Role of Legislature. 19th Meeting of Senior 
Budget Officials, Paris 25-26 May 1998, op. cit., p. 37. See also Joachim Wehner, “Reconciling 
Accountability and Fiscal Prudence? A Case Study of the Budgetary Role and Impact of the German 
Parliament”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 7, n. 2, (Summer) 2001, pp. 57-78. 
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Literature to investigate the role of the legislature in budgetary politics has also 
emerged. These studies argue that a Parliament’s ability to shape the budget is deeply 
affected by institutional factors. Institutions in this context refer to the “rules of the 
game,” that is, the procedural and structural mechanisms that actors use to influence 
policy outcomes (North 1990). 
For example, Krafchik and Wehner argue that the impact a legislature can have on the 
budget depends on the formal design of amendment powers, on the scope of conferred 
powers and on the role of committees (Krafchik and Wehner 1998).5 Poterba and Hagen 
also consider the effect of a broad array of legislative institutions on fiscal policy 
(Poterba and Hagen 1999). The more institutions allow a greater number of actors to 
influence budgetary politics, the more difficult it is to bring budget deficits under 
control.  For example, budgetary institutions include procedures such as the timing of 
voting or amendments procedures (Alesina and Perotti 1999). These procedures create 
iterative collective action problems in which individual legislators from the government 
and opposition continually find incentives to defect from austerity agreements and 
secure particular benefits for narrow constituencies. This occurs at the expense of 
collective fiscal austerity. 
 
When procedurally permitted, legislatures may serve to alter an executive’s original 
budget proposal. Each country’s institutional opportunities thus affect the incentive 
structures that individual legislators can manipulate.6 The availability of these types of 
procedures empowers the legislature. Though minor, this influence should be 
understood. Parliaments are not universally impotent, especially in the presence of 
particular types of party systems that are conducive to shifting majorities. 
 
Party system theories 
 
A Parliament’s ability to shape, alter and modify the national budget is also affected by 
political factors. Most theories concerning the party system generally argue that 
legislatures naturally defer to executive proposals simply because parliaments are 
governments are ‘fused.’ Because the government must maintain majority support in the 
legislature in order to survive, it follows that legislatures should support government 
proposals, especially important ones.7 According to Laver and Shepsle: 
 
In terms of practical politics, however, a cabinet in which the government 
parties control a majority of seats in parliament can summon up a legislative 
                                                          
5 There are three main types of conferred powers: unrestricted, restricted, and balanced budget. 
6 This point should not be overstated, however. In virtually all legislatures, changes to the executive’s 
budget are often minor. But the point remains that in some countries, the government’s budget may not 
always be passed as presented. 
7 According to Laver and Shepsle “the role of the legislature is much more that of controlling the fate of 
government than it is of implementing policy directly” (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 57).  
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majority whenever it cares to do so, provided party discipline holds firm. Thus a 
majority government with disciplined parties can comprehensively dominate any 
legislature once it has been installed in office. This in turn means that the 
legislature cannot in practice pass laws constraining the government.8 (Laver 
and Shepsle 1996: 57).  
 
Despite the power of this parsimonious argument, there are still significant exceptions 
to this rule. Laver and Shepsle themselves define the conditions under which 
parliaments would engage in activities to challenge their governments: “when party 
discipline breaks down and dissident members of a government party join forces with 
the opposition to pass legislation on some particular issue,” it is possible for the 
parliament to impose “its will on a majority executive” (Laver and Shepsle 1996: 40). 
 
A corollary of such political theories thus suggests that it is particularly difficult for 
governments to always control their legislative majorities and keep them together when 
the parliamentary party system is highly fragmented and when there are profound 
ideological divisions in the legislature. Therefore we expect that parliamentary 
influence is not only affected by the institutional opportunities in parliament, but by the 
party system as well.  
 
The Italian Parliament 
 
The Italian Parliament provides a perfect setting to test the institutional and party 
system theories because there have been major revisions to the institutional design and 
to the party system over the past 20 years. These changes may have had an effect on 
parliamentarians’ abilities to influence financial legislation. The institutional revisions 
include the removal of the secret vote (1988), a revision of the parliament’s 
decentralized agenda setting process (1990), and the reduction of preference votes in the 
electoral system (1991). In addition, the electoral system has changed (1993), which 
may have led to a different configuration of political parties in the party system.  
 
Institutional Factors 
The Secret Vote  
 
Until 1988, the standing orders of the Parliament allowed secret voting. No official 
record was kept on how each MP voted; only the number and names of those present 
and voting were recorded and counted. Though the government should have had enough 
support to pass its bills, the government was often defeated (and embarrassingly so) on 
many bills, including important proposals, during the first 40 years of the Republic.  
 
However, because no official record was recorded, party whips could not know who 
was responsible for the government’s defeat – the so-called franchi tiratori – and thus 
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no sanctions could be imposed on defectors. This problem often stalemated the 
executive and caused numerous governments to collapse. Ironically, these stalemates 
occurred even during times of oversized government, when the government should have 
been able to garner enough support from its parliamentary majority to pass its bills.  
Because this problem threatened Italian political stability, reform legislation passed in 
1988 abolished the provision of secret voting, except for very special circumstances, 
such as votes of no confidence. The open vote (il voto palese) is now required for the 
great majority of all bills. The use of the secret vote is important for the empowerment 
of the parliament before 1988 because party members were able to defect without 
sanction from party leaders. Government party leaders especially could use parliament 
during financial debates for their own benefit, rather than unilaterally supporting the 
government on financial legislation.  
 
Parliamentary agenda setting 
 
In 1971, the Italian Parliament passed reforms to implement a unique agenda setting 
formula that extended veto power to a leader from each parliamentary group during the 
determination of the legislative agenda and calendar (Leonardi et al 1978; della Sala 
1988, 1998; Cotta 1994). Setting the parliamentary agenda is an important tool to 
manipulate public policy (Doering 2001; Tsebelis, 2002). For example, in 1986 the 
government suffered a significant setback when the order of voting for the Financial 
Bill was discussed. The Minister of the Treasury (DC) wanted to vote on the total 
spending amount in Article 1 first in order to set an upper cap for spending, but the 
opposition argued that it preferred to vote on other articles first and on Article 1 last. 
The opposition clearly did not want to limit the amount of money Parliament could 
commit to spending, and knew that it could, through subsequent amendments, raise the 
overall amount as long as the ceiling was not already set. The crucial point is that the 
agenda setting process in the Italian Parliament prohibited the government from 
imposing a timetable unattractive to the opposition. As a result the government was 
defeated and the Finance Law was passed over two months late. Della Sala argues: 
 
The important point about this discussion on what seems to be a technical point 
is that it highlights the fact that the government has few guarantees over the fate 
of its program once it reaches Parliament…The government was defeated over 
an issue it saw as crucial for achieving its objectives primarily because it had 
few levers which it could pull once the bill reached Parliament. (della Sala, 
1988:121) 
 
Because of persistent problems with the agenda, additional reforms were passed in 1990 
to strengthen the President of the Chamber, who currently has the ability to impose an 
agenda when a unanimous vote does not pass.  
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Preference Votes 
 
Another significant institutional factor empowering Parliament was Italy’s electoral 
system. Until 1993, when it was reformed by the laws 276/93 and 277/93, the Italian 
electoral system used proportional representation. This system was coupled with 
preference voting, which allowed voters to express their preference for a specific 
candidate. Voters could express up to three or four such preferences until 1991, when, 
in the wake of a national referendum, the number of preferences that voters could 
express on the ballot was reduced to only one. The PR system with single preference 
(preferenza unica) was used only in the 1992 elections, until the system was further 
revised from PR to a mixed electoral system in 1993. But before 1991, preference 
voting affected the political behavior of voters as well as of the elected officials. 
Though in most PR systems, voters express a single choice for a party, candidates in 
Italy were concerned not only inter-party competition but also with intra-party 
competition because a higher number of preference votes could make a difference for a 
legislative seat. As a result, MPs often competed against members of their own party to 
secure the highest number of preference votes. This gave individual MPs strong 
incentives to secure constituency benefits and to gain popularity and name recognition. 
The more benefits an MP managed to secure for her potential voters the more 
preference votes the MP could expect to receive in the next election. Because of the 
preference vote, opposition members knew that engaging in collaborative activities with 
members of other parties could result in increased constituency benefits for all MPs. 
 
Party System Factors 
 
In addition to producing strong incentives for individual MPs to secure constituency 
benefits, the pre-1993 PR electoral system also produced a highly fragmented and 
ideologically polarized party system. In 1990, the number of effective parties in the 
Italian Parliament was 7.45, the second highest among the Western European 
democracies. For this time period, only Belgium had a slightly higher number of 
parties.9 In addition, the extent of ideological polarization among Italian parties was 
also the second highest in Western Europe as well.10 Only France had more extensive 
polarization. France and Italy are similar with regard to polarization; traditionally in the 
postwar period, there was significant support for extreme left-wing and extreme right-
wing parties in both countries. Extensive fragmentation and polarization produced 
undisciplined parliaments. Because of fragmentation, bargaining costs within 
parliament were quite high. Individual defection from party mandates and shifting 
                                                          
9 The higher number of effective parties in Belgium must be qualified by the fact that many Belgium 
parties operate in pairs to reflect differences in region and language. 
10 Polarization is measured as the percentage of support for the extreme left and extreme right wing 
parties. In Italy these are the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement 
(MSI). 
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coalitions among individuals and parties were not uncommon. In addition, the presence 
of extreme ideological polarization led to two phenomena. First, MPs learned to logroll 
particularistic policies that often spent government funds unchecked. Notoriously 
referred to as the leggine, these are minute forms of legislation passed in parliament (di 
Palma 1977). One clear indication of this trend is the number of individual spending 
proposals introduced in parliament each year. At least before 1979, the number of items 
voted by Parliament each year was “about 300 for revenues and approximately 3,000 
for expenditures” (Onofri 1979:298). Because encompassing collective decisions were 
difficult to reach, Italian MPs learned to use decision rules in the parliament for policy 
benefits in their own constituencies. Second, fragmentation meant that parliamentary 
majorities are often formed among ideologically dissimilar parties. Bills had to reflect a 
variety of interests before receiving majority support. Otherwise they faced intense 
scrutiny in parliament. 
 
How have these processes changed in the wake of the institutional reform and changes 
to the political landscape? First, with the removal of the secret vote in 1988, the passage 
of reforms in 1990 to allow the President of the Chamber to impose a parliamentary 
agenda, and the introduction of the single preference 1991, the system of incentives was 
dramatically transformed. In addition, it is possible that the restructing of the electoral 
system in 1993 altered the party system as well. If it is true that the institutional 
mechanisms that permit extensive policy influence have been removed, and if the party 
system is no longer as fragmented or polarized as before, then the benefits of defecting 
from government-party unity should decline. Therefore, if the logic between 
parliamentary strength and the intersection of procedural mechanisms and legislative 
fragmentation and polarization is correct, there should be a steady decline of 
parliamentary influence starting in 1988. 
 
 
Data Analysis 
 
OLS regressions are used to test whether the institutional and/or party system changes 
have influenced parliament’s ability to amend the government’s budget. The dependent 
variable is the percentage difference between the government’s proposed bill and the 
parliament’s approved law for the spending side of both the Budget. Superficially, these 
data implicate quite clearly that the Italian parliament has not always been a ‘rubber 
stamp’ on financial policy. Instead, at times the Italian Parliament has been an 
important actor in the determination of spending prorities. See Table 1. 
 
   [Table 1 about here.] 
 
We use several independent variables, based on the theories elaborated above, to 
explain differing levels of parliamentary interference in spending priorities in Italy. 
First, our measure of legislative institutions tracks the changes to the institutional design 
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of the Italian Parliament over the past 20 years.11  Second, to measure party system 
attributes, both legislative polarization and legislative fragmentation are included. 
Legislative polarization is measured as the sum of the seats held by the most left-wing 
and the most right-wing parties. For most years, the two most extreme parties were the 
Italian Communist Party and the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, often comprising 
at least 30% of the total seat share. The larger the seat share of extremist parties, the 
more polarized the parliament. The percentage of seat share for extreme parties 
changed, however, after international events dampened the appeal of the Communist 
Party, domestic scandals shook the major parties, and the electoral system changed from 
PR to a mixed majoritarian formula. These changes may have also influenced the 
number of effective parties (Taagerpera and Shugart 1989).  
 
The results of our regression analyses are presented in Table 2. When we regress the 
percentage change between the budget proposed by the government and the budget 
approved by the parliament against polarization we find, as expected, that the 
parliament’s ability to modify the budget increases as polarization increases. 
Polarization by itself explains more than 45% in the variance of the parliament’s ability 
to alter the budget. This is because more disperse points of view need accommodation 
in order to reach consensus in parliament. But when we regress the percentage change 
between the proposed budget and the approved budget against fragmentation we find, in 
contrast to what party system theory claims, that the parliament’s ability to change the 
government budget declines as fragmentation increases. This anomaly could very well 
be explained by the fact that when a parliament is too fragmented it becomes 
increasingly difficult to form any alternate majority and that can change the status quo. 
Next, when we regress the percentage change between the government budget and the 
budget approved by the parliament we find that institutional change largely explains the 
Italian parliament’s ability to modify the budget. In fact, institutional change accounts 
for 64% of the variance in the parliament’s power to alter the government budget. And 
finally, when all the independent variables are entered in our model we find that while 
institutional change remains a fairly strong and significant determinant of the 
parliament’s ability to change the government budget, the influence of both polarization 
and fragmentation becomes insignificant. This suggests that the institutional variable 
trumps the power of the party system. Based on this finding, we preliminarily conclude 
that parliamentary institutions, at least in the Italian context, are more important than 
the party system in explaining the extensive amount of parliamentary influence in the 
determination of spending priorities. 
  
                                                          
11 The institutions variable is measured as follows: Value of 3 for 1982-1988 to measure the presence of 
secret voting, the inclusive agenda setting process, and the use of three or four preference votes 
(depending on the district) in the electoral system. Value of 2 for 1988-1990 to measure the presence of 
the inclusive agenda setting process and the use of three or four preference votes in the electoral system. 
Value of 1 for 1991-1992 to measure the use of only one preference vote in the electoral system. Value of 
0 after 1993; the electoral system changed from pure proportional representation with preference votes to 
a mixed system with no preference votes.  
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   [Table 2 about here.] 
 
Conclusions 
 
Clearly, more testing is required, both within the Italian context and comparatively, to 
determine the power of institutions and the party system in explaining how and when 
parliaments would be expected to influence national budgets. Based on the results of 
this analysis, using novel data to gauge the difference between the first and last drafts of 
budget legislation, institutions explain more of the variation in parliamentary influence. 
This tentative finding could be, however, spurious. Institutional reform took place 
before the party system changed and thus the effect we note may not be absolute. It is 
entirely possible that had the reforms proceeded in the reverse (changing the electoral 
system before changing the procedural mechanisms), the party system variables would 
have explained more than the institutional ones. More testing in other contexts would 
confirm the power of the independent variables. At the very least, this analysis has 
served to demonstrate that these variables do explain part of parliamentary influence in 
the budget. Comparatively, we would not expect parliaments to be ‘rubber stamps’ at 
all. The specific rules in parliament and the number and ideological bent of parties 
combine to provide incentives for parliaments to deviate from what is considered 
standard parliamentary behavior, in which parliaments unilaterally support their 
governments during the passage of the national budget.  
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Table 1. Italian Budget Laws for 1982 to 2001. Figure indicated is the total amount of spending for each 
year. All amounts are in billions of lire.12
 
 
 
For Year 
PROPOSED  
by Government 
PASSED  
by Parliament 
Percent 
Difference 
1982 135460 164087 17% 
1983 172772 203510 15% 
1984 227077 242321 6% 
1985 274163 297597 8% 
1986 280900 334543 16% 
1987 311432 358997 13% 
1988 368360 414814 11% 
1989 388562 406271 4% 
1990 456202 445655 -2% 
1991 498505 509594 2% 
1992 541967 559556 3% 
1993 612696 588981 -4% 
1994 563208 549658 -2% 
1995 611073 611390 0% 
1996 647486 637007 -2% 
1997 633348 642245 1% 
1998 634393 653414 3% 
1999 658278 672500 2% 
2000 673282 679779 1% 
2001 700646 725944 3% 
 
 
                                                          
12 There is a fairly high correlation between the amount of influence in the Financial and Budget Laws: 
r=.62. This suggests that the same underlying processes are at work for both laws. In addition, since the 
Finance Bill is passed first, the Budget Bill is modified to reflect each Finance Law’s new ceiling for 
spending (when applicable). This is partially the reason the correlation between the two is high.  
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Table 2. Regression Analyses. 
Dependent 
variable 
Intercept Independent Variables (sig.) R-squared 
Percent change 
between 
proposed 
budget and 
passed budget 
 Polarization Fragmentation Institutional 
Change 
 
 -8.593 
(.027) 
.494 
(.001) 
  .464 
 24.259 
(.000) 
 -3.777 
(.001) 
 .497 
 -.187 
(.884) 
  3.886 
(.000) 
.640 
 -7.400 
(.623) 
.027 
(.902) 
1.075 
(.615) 
4.629 
(.033) 
.645 
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